Introduction
Statebuilding discourses -and the concomitant discourses over state failure or state fragility -have shifted substantially over the last decade, both among scholars and donors. While early work focussed largely on questions of state capacity -e.g. territorial control or the provision of basic public goods and services 1 -or more controversially on regime type (e.g. lack of democracy) 2 , and on ways in which state capacity could be strengthened or regimes transformed, recently there has been a greater recognition of the importance of political authority. The building of legitimate political authority has been identified as a central aspect of statebuilding efforts both by academics, 3 and by donors such as DFID, the OECD/DAC and the World Bank. 4 This shift in thinking about state fragility and statebuilding (to the extent that it is reflected in statebuilding practice) 5 is substantial, as it implicitly recognises the deeply political nature of statebuilding. While there is undoubtedly an important political dimension to building capacity (as strengthening the capacity of particular actors and organisations can shift the underlying balances of power in a war-torn society), 6 it is largely construed as a technical activity involving the design and strengthening of institutions and processes, of training, and of resources. 7 In contrast to capacity to develop and implement public policy and deliver public goods, war-torn states rarely lack authority -or to be more precise, they do not lack actors making authority claims. These claims, however, are often competing and mutually exclusive, and importantly they are often not widely recognised (if at all). Building authority, therefore, means that external statebuilding actors have to make a choice between different actors and organisations, recognising the authority claims of some and withhold recognition from others, and seek ways to strengthen their ability to justify their authority claims vis-à-vis domestic and international audiences. Through authority building practices, external actors directly become part of the political competition and dynamics of war-affected societies.
Authority building in the context of international statebuilding interventions, however, not only relates to local political authority. Given that almost all statebuilding efforts have substantial transformative ambitions for the scope and character of the state and of statesociety relationships, they themselves make authority claims with regard to local elites and the wider population. In some cases -military occupations, complex peace operations, and in particular in international transitional administrations -external actors exercise limited or comprehensive state functions: executive, legislative, as well as judicial. 8 Any analysis of authority building in the context of statebuilding interventions therefore needs to take account of the complex relationship between the building of international and of local authority in these environments.
This article critically examines authority-building practices in the context of statebuilding through the lens of one particular form of external statebuilding interventions: international 6 A recent study of the Asia Foundation, for example, highlights how donor aid to strengthen government capacity can fuel sub-national conflict. See Thomas Parks, Nat Colletta, and Ben Oppenheim, The Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance (Bangkok: The Asia Foundation, 2013). 7 As Ken Menhkaus has argued, "By reducing state failure to a matter of low capacity, this view lends itself to technical solutions . . . More funding, better trained civil servants, a more professionalised and equipped police force, and a healthy dose of democratisation (where not politically inconvenient) have been the main elements of state-building strategies. transitional administrations (ITAs), which are established by international organisations (mainly the UN) to exercise governmental functions over a territory, and in some cases to engage in the establishment or reform of political, administrative, and economic institutions.
9
ITAs are interesting for this analysis both because their formal-legal mandates are arguably the most intrusive of all types of multilateral interventions, with international (normally UNmandated) actors exercising different degrees of executive, legislative, and judicial authority, and because in their post-cold war incarnation they have frequently had far-reaching statebuilding (and authority building) responsibilities. The analysis below will draw in particular on one ITA, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
The objective of this article, however, is not the detailed examination of particular authority building practices, or to evaluate the practices of a particular international administration.
Instead, it aims to critically evaluate authority building as a framework for understanding the practices of statebuilding operations, and to understand the complexities of political authority in statebuilding environments, and their implications for both the pursuit and the analysis of authority building.
The discussion of authority building by ITAs will proceed in three steps. The next section will briefly outline the concept of political authority, in particular in the context of fragile and conflict-affected states and of international administrations, and discuss relevant methodological issues. Building on this, section two then examines three distinct aspects of authority building by ITAs: claiming and justifying their own authority; recognising and validating the authority claims of local actors and organisations; and strengthening the capacity of local actors to justify their authority claims. The final section concludes the paper with some reflections on political authority and authority building that arise from the discussion in the previous sections. 
Conceptualizing and Studying the Authority and International Transitional Administrations
Before embarking on an analysis of authority building, it is important to be clear on what this paper means by authority, and how it will be studied. This section sets out the basic conceptual and methodological framework for this analysis.
Conceptualising the Authority of International Administrations
Following Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd, authority is defined as "a relation among actors within a hierarchy in which one group is recognized as having both the right and the competence to take binding decisions for the rest of the community." 10 Authority, therefore, is a form of power, but power resting on recognition based on legitimacy, rather than coercion or material incentives. In John Ruggie's memorable phrase, authority is "the fusion of power with legitimate social purpose."
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Authority has therefore several characteristics that help with identifying and evaluating practices of authority building by ITAs. The first is that authority is a social concept that needs to be both claimed and recognized. This raises the questions of who makes authority
claims, at what audiences they are directed; and also whose recognition matters, and why? Third, authority requires competence, the capacity to make and to some extent enforce decisions, if necessary through coercion. David Lake has argued for the importance for an authority to have some capacity for coercion, "to sustain authority in the face of incentives to flout the rules designed to constrain behaviour". 12 Competence, however, is not only important for the prevention of rule-breaking and ensuring the fair application of rules to those subject to an authority, but also to provide the wider public goods for which other actors voluntarily submit to authority. Authority building can therefore not be separated from building the capacity to make and enforce decisions.
Studying the Authority-Building Practices of International Administrations
The examination of authority building practices of ITAs raises three important methodological issues: first, how to identify relevant practices; second, how to study them;
and third, the justification of cases. 
ITAs
Practices that assert and justify the right of an ITA to exercise political power textual analysis of speeches, visual images like graffiti, and secondary literature to identify and discuss different practices. As the main objective of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework to understand the authority building practices of international administrations, the purpose of the discussion of actual practices is merely to evaluate the utility of the proposed analytical framework, not to assess changes in ITA practice or to systematically evaluate the impact of particular practices. The empirical discussion of different practices is therefore illustrative and exploratory, rather than comprehensive and evaluative.
The third methodological issue concerns the selection of cases. As discussed earlier, 
Authority-building by International Transitional Administrations

Claiming and justifying their own authority
The seven international transitional administrations since the end of the cold war have claimed varying degrees of authority. over half a year, the presence of UNMIK outside the capital was severely constrained. By late 1999, UNMIK was present in only 18 of the territory's 29 municipalities, and it chaired the municipal board (and thus effectively claimed authority) in only nine of them. 31 Throughout the territory, its authority was challenged by a parallel administration declared by the UCK, which claimed administrative authority and which issued official documents and licenses in municipalities, "privatised" enterprises and land, and whose only partially demobilised fighters provided their own form of security and justice. 32 To effectively extend its formal authority and to contain these challenges, UNMIK had to co-opt these groups into the formal governance structures -which de facto recognised some of their authority claims, started a process of complex negotiations over and sharing of power between local elites and the international administration. 
Recognising the authority claims of selected local actors
Compared to the authority of international administrations themselves, the authority of local actors that ITAs seek to build and shape is arguably even more important for the longer-term 37 In most cases, the choice as to whose claims to recognise reflects the "reality on the ground": process, when local authority is fragile and contested, and recognition is seen as conferring the support and approval of the wider international community. For local actors, the obvious benefits from such recognition extend to the access to formal political institutions and to rents, which can support their ability to build a strong political base. Under several conditions, recognition by an international administration can be detrimental to the authority claims of local actors. In particular if an international administration is seen as not supporting key objectives of the local community (e.g. independence in Kosovo) and is seen as an obstacle to achieving it, its ability to build local authority through recognition is likely to be low, and local actors more likely to dissociate themselves from an ITA rather than seek its approval. Similarly, if local actors have alternative audiences that can provide them with similar benefits, for example because the international presence is divided and individual states will provide them with support, recognition from an ITA is unlikely to matter strongly.
Strengthen the capacity of selected local actors and organisations to advance and justify authority claims
Authority not only needs to be recognised, it also needs to be claimed, and the statebuilding efforts of ITAs are central to advancing the ability of particular local actors to make authority claims. While political authority can be claimed on a wide range of grounds in conflict affected states, including all three of Max Weber's ideal types of authority (charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational), 50 international administrations have largely focussed on building legal-rational authority, rooted in formal rules governing the access to and exercise of political power. 51 In addition to establishing the legal foundations for formal state institutions (e.g. through the drafting of constitutions, and electoral processes), the central focus of authority-building practices has been on strengthening the capacity of these institutions to deliver public services (in particular security), so that the state can fulfil its responsibilities under an implicit social contract and build authority vis-à-vis the population. 51 However, it is important to note that some recent statebuilding efforts have tried to fuse formal-legal with charismatic and traditional forms of authority. In East Timor, Xanana Gusmao's authority from early on under UNTAET arguably rested on his charismatic personality and his previous role as the leader of the resistance movement; while in Afghanistan, the use of the Loya Jirga, and of community-level Shuras (for example in Helmand) were efforts to fuse rational-legal authority with traditional elements.
society, deriving its authority from an implicit social contract. Strengthening state capacity then not only improves its ability to fulfill its responsibilities under a social contract but also strengthens its infrastructural power and its autonomy from sectional interests, 52 while the focus on accountability and democratic legitimacy aims to ensure that the state continues to act within the bounds of the social contract. "State-building", in the words of the OECD, therefore "involves the ongoing negotiation of an unwritten contract between state and society". 53 Associated with this view of statebuilding is a particular understanding of the particular "authority problem" that such environment pose, which is rooted in the weakness, persistent fragility and even the collapse of state institutions. 54 The lack of state capacityand with it the absence of state authority -is seen as the key challenge to be addressed by statebuilding, rather than the relationship between different social groups and the state, the competing authority claims that they make, and the role of state institutions in managing these competing claims. 55 When the state is not autonomous from sectional interests, reforming formal state institutions and strengthening their capacity is not a neutral, technical exercise but deeply political: it selectively strengthens the capacity of those actors controlling state institutions to support and enforce their authority claims. The breadth of these activities, and the variation across cases makes is unwise to generalise about their impact in this regard, but it is possible to make some broader observations with regard to several key statebuilding activities, such as the drafting of constitutions, and the strengthening of public service delivery.
Constitutional reforms are common aspects of international state-and peacebuilding efforts, However, as Oisin Tansey notes, despite these substantial formal powers, constitutional design processes tend to be strongly influenced by local political dynamics both during the drafting and the implementation of constitutional provisions. 60 Constitutions are rarely imposed but negotiated with local actors who have substantial capacity for resistance and adoption, resulting in "hybrid" outcomes that reflect a mixture of both international and local elite priorities, 61 which reflect a mixture of the "red lines" of international actors and the key priorities and interests of the most powerful local negotiators. These can be substantive (with regard to particular policy issues) or procedural (to entrench a particular power distribution).
With regard to the former, one of the best examples comes not from an ITA but from the related "transformative occupation" of Iraq following the 2003 US-led invasion, 62 where
Shiite negotiators managed to include into the Transitional Administrative Law a provision that forbade the passage of any law that contravened "the universally agreed tenants of Islam". 63 With regard to the latter, in East Timor the Fretilin party used its majority in the constitutional assembly to push through a constitution based largely on its own earlier draft and that arguably aimed in part at consolidating its dominant position within the Timorese political landscape: it explicitly recognised Fretilin's contribution to the independence struggle, employed the national symbols (anthem and flag) devised in 1975 when Fretilin declared East Timor's independence, and most importantly provided for a relatively weak presidency (which Fretilin expected to be Xanana Gusmao) vis-à-vis the government and parliament (which it could reasonably expect to dominate). 64 UNTAET's approval of the constitution-drafting process and support for the final document thus helped to entrench the existing political power structures.
The provision of public services is considered as central by donors to generating state legitimacy, and by extension state authority. 65 While models of "performance" or "output" legitimacy are theoretically and politically appealing (as they chime with well-established theories of the state and provide relatively clear pointers for policy), empirical support for the importance of service delivery for perceptions of state authority and legitimacy is contested:
as Claire McLoughlin points out, the relationship between service delivery and legitimacy is not linear, it is shaped by expectations from populations towards the state, and also by how public services are delivered. 66 For the purpose of this discussion, however, it is important to highlight another issue: improving the provision of public services is not a neutral exercise, but strengthens the ability of particular groups (those that control the government) to make authority claims. While it might be that donors use their assistance to improve service delivery strategically to support particular actors; local elites themselves, who through joint planning and aid allocation processes can have some influence over where aid is targeted (either in particular sectors or geographically), can seek to use this assistance strategically to entrench their authority. In Kenya for example (though not an example of international administration, but a country with a strong international aid presence), Ryan Jablonski has
shown that successive governments have consistently influenced aid allocation processes to direct assistance towards areas with many co-ethnic and co-partisan voters, to influence voting patterns and maximise the votes of the incumbent government. 67 ITAs, and international donors more generally, not only support states and governments, but also civil society. While the bulk of assistance and focus has been on the former, building the authority of civil society and strengthening its capacity to influence and constrain state power, in particular through greater monitoring and transparency, and through advocacy, has been an important part of donors' portfolio. From 2002 until 2012, assistance from OECD/DAC donors for civil society and democratic participation in fragile states has grown from $123 million to $600 million worldwide. 68 The role of civil society in peacebuilding has generated a large literature, which has, among other things, highlighted the problem of an "uncivil" civil society in conflict-affected states that is more likely to sustain than criticise exclusive and discriminatory structures of political authority. 69 Such uncivil societyrepresented in particular through veterans' organisations or martial arts clubs -has been an important feature of the political landscape of a range of countries with international administrations, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. 70 Even where civil society might conceivably pose a counterweight to state institutions and the groups controlling them, however, the practices of ITAs and donors more generally, tend to strengthen the position of the executive vis-a-vis actors that might control them, like civil society but also parliaments, in particular the tendency to work through governments, and rely heavily on closed door negotiations. 71 Also, even if funding for civil society support on fragile states has increased, it only makes up a small amount of the government and civil society support category of the OECD/DAC data -less than 10% in 2012, down from around 12% in 2002.
As with processes of claiming and recognising authority, capacity building efforts by international transitional administrations are shaped by the complex interactions between local elites and the international presence, which highlights the importance of paying attention to agency when examining practices of authority building. It also highlights that building authority is inherently political, and affects the question of who exercises power as much (or even more) as the questions of how and to what end it is exercised.
Conclusion
This paper examined the authority-building practices of international transitional administrations. Authority is normally conceived of in hierarchical terms, ascribing an entitlement to obedience to those actors in authority. As this paper suggests, in environments of international transitional administration, such a hierarchy might exist formally, reflected in particular in the strong mandates that many ITAs have been endowed with, but that in practice these relationships are far more complex and fluid. Similarly, ITA efforts of building political authority -both their own and that of local actors and institutions -are multifaceted, owing to the social nature of authority, and the need for it to be claimed as well as recognised. Four issues stand out in this regard.
First, environments with ITAs do not tend to suffer form an absence of authority (as much of the state failure literature suggests), but tend to suffer from multiple, and competing, authority claims. "Authority-building" is therefore not about creating authority, but rather about concentrating it, and formalising its exercise and justification. In all the cases discussed in this paper, ITAs did not create new authorities but strengthened and formalised the authority of actors that could already successfully claim it vis-à-vis selected audiences within the affected societies. have not been in a position to determine it, despite the comprehensive formal powers of the mandates of some ITAs.
Third, the discussion shows that local and international authority is closely intertwined in ITA contexts, and there are strong interdependencies between local and international actors and their authority claims. This interdependency is not only rooted in the character of the mandates of ITAs, and their inherently transitional nature, but more generally in the nature of political authority, in particular the importance of recognition by different audiences, both local and international.
Finally, a focus on authority and authority building in the context of the international administration of war-torn territories usefully shifts the focus of analysis to issues of agency.
Examining the claiming and recognition of political authority in such environments highlights how power and authority do not just depend on the rules and institutions that govern access to political office, and to rents and resources; but importantly also on the actions of those actors asserting or challenging these rules -both local and international. The focus on agency helps to understand that the "hybrid" outcomes that have been observed widely across state-and peacebuilding contexts are not so much the consequences of failed policies by international actors, but rather a reflection of the inherently contested, and constantly negotiated character of authority in such environments.
